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The South Caucasus, situated as it is at the crossroads of Eurasia’s major en-
ergy and transport corridors, continues to play a vital role in the world’s security 
 affairs. After the end of the cold war the South Caucasus emerged as a key region 
in the geopolitical contest among regional and global powers. The South Caucasus 
states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are constantly performing a balancing 
act in their relations with the U.S., Russia, Turkey and Iran. Armenia has devel-
oped strong political and economic ties with Iran in order to counter the Turkish-
Azerbaijani axis. Azerbaijan seeks to reinforce its links with the West, especially the 
U.S., as its main extraregional source of diplomatic and economic support, while it 
remains cautious towards both Russian and Iranian ambitions in the region. Espe-
cially after the 2008 war with Russia and the loss of its provinces of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, Georgia has reinforced its links to Western powers and structures 
while strengthening its ties with Turkey. Both Turkey and Iran are trying to increase 
their influence in the region, while promoting their national interests in the interna-
tional arena.
Turkey’s interests in and policies towards  
the South Caucasus
Turkey has a growing economy that achieved an 8.5% 
growth rate in 2011 and a gross domestic product (GDP) 
that reached almost $1.125 trillion in 2012 (CIA, n.d.). 
Turkey is strategically important because it acts as a 
natural link to markets in the Caucasus, Central Asia, the 
Balkans and the Gulf region. Turkey is also a gateway to 
energy resources such as natural gas and oil pipelines in its 
neighbourhood. As such it is wrong to assume that Turkey 
shares Western approaches and policies in all matters 
concerning its East-facing policy. Turkey has demonstrated 
strategic and regional autonomy that is sometimes distinct 
from U.S. goals and interests in the region.
Since the end of the cold war Turkey has worked towards a 
policy of rapprochement with the three new republics in the 
Caucasus, pursuing regular mutual high-level visits and 
promoting initiatives for stability and co-operation in the 
region. In March 1991 President Turgut Ozal visited 
 Azerbaijan and regular flights started between Istanbul and 
Baku. In the same year the Turkish ambassador in Mos-
cow, Volkan Vural, undertook the first official visit to 
Armenia by a Turkish diplomat, to discuss the improvement 
of bilateral relations. 
The Caucasus Stability and Co-operation Platform an-
nounced in 2008, the Protocol on the Establishment of 
Diplomatic Relations, and the Protocol on the Development 
of Relations signed with Armenia in Zürich in 2009 make 
the enhancement of security and stability in the region a 
part of Turkish diplomatic efforts.1 There have been some 
international efforts to solve the stalemate in the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict with Turkish participation, e.g. the 
1  Protocols available at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ official website: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-armenia.en.mfa>. The ratifica-
tion process has currently been suspended by Armenia, mainly because of Turkey’s refusal to move forward without preconditions, due to the dispute over the enclave 
of Nagorno-Karabakh. 
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Madrid Principles developed by the Organisation for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Minsk Group. 
However, Turkey has never been actively involved in the 
peacebuilding process dealing with the Nagorno-Karabagh 
conflict and its position is considered to be pro-Azerbaijani. 
Indeed, since 1993 Turkey has closed its borders with 
Armenia, thus supporting its ally Azerbaijan over the 
Nagarno-Karabakh stalemate.
The complexity of Turkey’s relationship with the three 
South Caucasian states makes a “zero-problems policy” 
rhetoric difficult to put into practice. In reality, economic 
relations between Turkey and Armenia are limited by the 
closed land border and the lack of diplomatic relations 
between the two countries due to some unresolved issues, 
such as the Turkish denial that the mass killings of 
Ottoman Armenians in 1915 constituted a genocide and 
Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan, primarily over the 
 Nagorno-Karabakh dispute (The Economist, 2011). 
Unlike Turkey’s relations with Armenia, its relations with 
Azerbaijan and Georgia remain strong and vital. A number 
of energy and communication projects tie these countries 
to Turkey. These regional projects include the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan (BTC) crude oil pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum 
natural gas pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway 
(Starr & Cornell, 2005). Interestingly, Turkey is also one of 
the main suppliers of arms to Azerbaijan and Georgia and 
possesses military facilities in both states. Both Azerbaijan 
and Georgia consider Turkey as a link to the West and 
particularly to Western international structures such as 
NATO. 
Yet down through history an anti-Turkish stereotype has 
been cultivated in Georgian society. It is true that in the 
past the Muslim Ottomans threatened Georgian nationhood 
more than the Christian Russians did. However, Turkey is 
currently Georgia’s biggest trading partner. The two 
countries have recently signed a visa-free agreement by 
which their citizens can cross the border with only domes-
tic identity documents. In addition, Georgia’s new govern-
ment under Bidzina Ivanishvili has committed itself to a 
pro-Western policy like that of his predecessors. Turkey 
could be a key partner for bringing Georgia closer to NATO 
and remains Georgia’s friendliest neighbour (De Waal, 
2012).
Turkey’s value to NATO, on the other hand, has increased 
following the Arab Spring, and particularly the civil war in 
Syria and Iranian support for President Bashar al-Assad. 
Additionally, Turkey agreed to host part of the U.S.-European 
missile defence shield, a radar system to protect against 
ballistic missiles launched by so-called rogue states (mainly 
Iran and North Korea). This development reinforces Turkish 
geostrategic importance for its Western allies but foments 
Russia’s opposition: Russia views the planned system as 
targeted against it. 
Indeed, Turkey has played an active role in security issues 
and a leading role with regard to regional economic 
development and integration that could lead to stability and 
peace in the South Caucasus. However, energy policy and 
the influence associated with it will continue to determine 
Turkish choices in the region case by case. Therefore it 
seems that Turkey will pursue even closer co-operation 
with Azerbaijan and Georgia in terms of developing trade 
and energy relations, while simultaneously adopting 
cautious policies towards conflict zones, thus maximising 
its relevance for the region. 
In fact, Turkey’s foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, 
recently claimed that Turkey will work harder in this 
regard, as history is expected to flow faster in 2013: “We 
will take steps to distinguish Turkey. Turkish diplomacy will 
break the habits, will break the mould” (Davutoğlu, 2013).
Iran and the quest for power
“Reforming the world’s affairs and bringing about 
tranquillity and prosperity requires the participation of 
all, pure thoughts, and divine and human management” 
(Ahmadinejad, 2011). 
Iran’s foreign policy towards the Caucasus seeks basically 
to diminish the Western influence in the region. Tehran’s 
policy is based on pragmatism, seeking ways to build ties 
with the South Caucasus countries while placing a special 
emphasis on stability.
Azerbaijan’s early orientation towards Turkey and the West, 
and its disregard for Russia and Iran have been matters of 
concern to Iran. The BTC pipeline has broken Russia’s 
monopoly on oil exports and bypassed Iran. Yet over the 
years Iran and Azerbaijan have been working towards 
closer co-operation. 
The two countries have signed an agreement banning the 
use of their respective territories for launching an attack 
on the other and Azerbaijan supports Iran’s right to the 
peaceful use of nuclear technology. In the economic field 
energy and gas exchange agreements have been dominat-
ing Iranian-Azerbaijani relations. The Azerbaijani exclave of 
Nakhchivan is totally dependent on Iranian natural gas. 
Average Azerbaijani imports of natural gas from Iran 
between July 2011 and June 2012 were 26 million cubic 
feet per day (USEIA, 2012). With the completion of some 
ongoing projects, the transfer capacity of electricity 
between Iran and Azerbaijan is expected to increase from 
200 to 600 MW. Nonetheless, the core Iranian issue in the 
region is ethnic tension with Azerbaijan. Indeed, Iran’s rela-
tions with Azerbaijan could worsen rapidly if there is any 
Azerbaijani involvement in supporting nationalist feelings 
among ethnic Azeris in Iran (which account for 16% of the 
population). In addition, Iran and Azerbaijan experience 
further tensions, including conflicting claims on maritime 
and seabed boundaries in the Caspian Sea, and Iran’s 
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support for Armenia’s position in the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict. 
From the Armenian perspective, relations with Iran are 
based on common geopolitical objectives. Iran sees 
Armenia as a key country – a geographically isolated state 
that can benefit from growing ties with Iran, allowing the 
latter to reinforce its political stance in the region. Armenia 
and Iran have agreed to the construction of a third power 
transmission line connecting the Armenian and Iranian 
power grids. In 2011 the High Voltage Line Company began 
the construction of a high-voltage 400 kW transmission line 
(Arka News Agency, 2012). A gas pipeline from Iran to 
Armenia was inaugurated in 2007 and discussions were 
held on the construction of a second one. Infrastructural 
projects such as the current construction of a highway from 
Armenia to the Iranian border are also under way. Although 
Armenia has the deepest ties to Iran of any other South 
Caucasus state, its role in U.S.-Iranian antagonism is 
limited. Turkish-Armenian and Armenian-Azerbaijani 
disputes are more important to regional security and 
stability for both Iran and the West.
Georgia has the least developed relations with Iran among 
the South Caucasus states. Iran is not even on the list of 
Georgia’s top ten trading partners (Ministry of Economy 
and Sustainable Development of Georgia, 2013). The 
primary Iranian strategic interest in Georgia is to limit U.S. 
and Turkish influence in the country, deepen economic and 
trade ties, and ensure stability in a way that does not 
impact on Iranian security. Georgia sees commercial and 
strategic possibilities in an improved relationship with Iran. 
Yet Prime Minister Ivanishvili’s attention is mostly focused 
on the West, viewing the U.S. and European Union (EU) as 
the best way to enhance Georgia’s power and limit Russian 
influence.
Iran is extremely keen on gaining access to European 
energy markets by expanding electricity and natural gas 
pipeline networks through the Caucasus to Europe. 
However, it remains to be seen how successful Iran can be 
in achieving this goal, given Russian-Iranian competition on 
issues such as oil and gas exports, sharing Caspian 
resources, and securing regional gas markets, and the U.S. 
interest in containing Iran, mainly its nuclear capability. 
In the future, Iran’s relations with the three South Cauca-
sus states will continue to develop along the same lines of 
power politics. Armenia has frozen relations with Turkey 
and thus Iran offers a good substitute. Iran perceives its 
Azeri minority as a potential separatist threat, and because 
the country is currently facing a series of economic and 
political challenges, a domestic upheaval among its own 
Azeri population is not desirable. For Georgia, which seeks 
to minimise its energy dependence on Russia, Iran could be 
an alternative market. 
For the time being, though, Iran will continue to seek the 
widening of its influence in the South Caucasus and to 
prevent conflicts in the region from affecting co-ethnics 
inside its borders. Iran’s strategy rests on both deterrence 
and competition with the U.S. However, Iran, eager to gain 
an exclusive sphere of influence, needs to acknowledge its 
true capacities.
Last but not least, in terms of Iran’s relations with Turkey, 
there have been periods of both collaboration and conflict 
over the years. Currently, Turkey and Iran have strong 
economic and energy ties. According to the Turkish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs oil and natural gas purchases 
account for 90% of Iranian exports to Turkey (Cordesman, 
2013). Moreover, Turkey does not believe that the continued 
Western sanctions offer a true solution to the Iranian 
nuclear weapons problem, and on this basis Turkey has 
promoted itself as an honest broker between Iran and the 
West. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, though, cold 
relations between the two countries, mainly due to their 
support of different camps in the Syrian civil war, have 
made this goal very difficult to achieve. In addition, Turkey’s 
attention has turned mostly to the Middle East, at the cost 
of its overall policy towards the South Caucasus.
Iran and Turkey do, however, share a common interest in 
avoiding further turmoil in the region. But in order to best 
work together towards this goal, both countries have to 
resolve the divergence between their need to achieve 
economic co-operation and their conflicting security 
policies. 
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